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Despite the alleged backwardness of the social formation, the State in the South 
African Republic substantially guaranteed the most important conditions for capital 
accumulation by the gold mining companies as well as for the acquisition of land for 
its citizen-fanners. In respect of the latter, it had from its inception in the mid- 
century secured social relations through its system of segcegation, and set aside 
seventy million morgen of land for Whites and (nominally) restricted the territory of 
the African rural population to less than one million morgen. (1) African agriculture 
and grazing, however, continued to be an important factor in the Transvaal exchange 
economy, at least until 1913, during which access to productive land served to check 
migration to the mines. (2) Though excluded from the institutions of the State and 
the franchise, their presence was always reflected in State policies in respect of the 
administration, land, labour and the military. 
With the discovery and extraction of gold on the Witwatersrand in the late 
1880s and the influx of international capital, mining engineers and a substantial 
foreign polulation associated with the industry, the State varied its system of 
segregation by physically excluding these elements from its various institutions and 
accommodating the owners of mining capital with legal guarantees regarding the 
conditions of ownership of working claims, the mineral wealth and the profits from its 
extraction. The amended Gold Law of 1886, subsequently to become Law No. 15 of 1898 
and amended once again in 1908, maintained the conditions of Article 76 of the 
original Law and confined the licences to mine the gold to foreign (or local) capital 
provided it was "Whitet1. "No coloured person, coolie or Chinese can hold a licence 
or be in any capacity engaged in working the gold fields, otherwise than in the service 
of white men." (3) There was hardly any likelihood of non-white individuals having 
the necessa.ry capital to embark upon such investment, but possibly the mineowners 
feared collective enterprise (common in African farming) and included the conditions 
of Article 76 in all vaxiants of the Gold Law. Both the Republican and post-Republican 
States provided advantageous conditions for mining capital. Neither State gave famers 
or landowners protection (from prospecting) of homesteads and lands under cultivation 
or any guarantees for damage to the surface or land or stock. (4) Taxation was 
generously low at 5% of the admitted profits of mining until 1900, and 10% in a revised 
system thereafter. In 1898, one of the Band magmtes claimed that the Gold Law placed 
in the hands of the mineowners "probably a higher percentage of the ... extracted 
mineral wealth, than . . . the mining laws of any other country". (5) Four years later, 
the Attorney General for the Transvaal described the Gold Law as "the most capitalistic 
law in the world1'. Not surprisingly, he added "... they would like to see it left 
alone1'. (6) Milner appointed a Commission in 1900 to enquire into the working of the 
old law, "abstained from any interference with . . . fundamental principles . . ." , and 
ignored the recommendations of a dissenting minority. 
The role of the State in regard to labour recruitment and the regulation 
and control of this labour force was, however, subject to considerable conflicts and 
pressures during the first decade of mining. "Legal" interference with mine labourers 
by the police in search of the requisite travelling passes was common, as was arrest 
and fines. Migrants were subject to harassment by white farmers over whose land they 
passed. If they were without food or money, they were compelled to work without 
papnent for a few days for the white farmer on the way to the goldfields, and 
frequently on their return journey they were prone to fines for trespassing. (7) The 
mineowners sought various remedies from the State for this position until the mid- 
nineties, when they achieved some internal reorganization of their recruiting 
mechanisms and coped with internecine company competition for labour. They saw their 
conflict with the State as indicative of their position in the social formation, 
where mining capital was of paramount significance but its representatives had no 
formal presence in the narrowly based institutions of the State. 
Despite this exclusion, there were several areas of an informal presence of 
mining capital, evidenced by the large-scale bribery of centrally placed members of 
the Executive and Volksraad, the frequent presentation of memorials to the Government, 
the formal acceptance by the executive of the Chamber of Mines (its leading members 
were honorary presidents of the chamber), the bribery of officials in the practical 
administration,. the acceptance of laws drafted by the mineowners (the Gold Law and 
the new Pass ~egulations) and the general impact of the gold industry on the social 
formation. (8) To a lesser extent these factors served to off-set the absence of 
representatives of mining capital in the formal institutions of State. But this was 
never enough for the mineowners to involve the State sufficiently in the maximization 
of labour recruitment, the securing of labour contracts, or to reverse the monopolist 
concessions which prevented the mines from reducing the costs of freight, explosives 
and stores. In the formative years of mining, the failure of the Chamber to obtain 
an extension of State intervention in labour recruitment and measures to restrict the 
turnover of recruits led it to refine its methods of pressure upon the State and 
constitute informal institutions that would parallel those of the State and possibly 
by-pass them. Thus, in 1890, the Chamber made representations to transfer the Native 
Registry Department from the control of the Government to itself, and to give it the 
necessary enabling powers to enforce regulations. But the social classes of farmers 
aYld landlords within the State were not prepared to release the control of the labour 
supply to the mining companies to this degree. After a further round of representations 
to the Volksraad, hoping that the government "would not allow [another] session to go 
by without making some legislative provision" either "by raising the hut tax" or some 
other means, the Chamber established its own Labour Committee which introduced control 
measures for the llsupply-pricell and regulation of the labour force. More specifically, 
it appointed '!an experienced officialI1 as Labour Commissioner to organize the supply 
and provide official sanction for labour contracts entered into with African headmen. 
The same official was endowed with the responsibility for the redress of grievances of 
the African work force. (9) 
The Chamber's Native Labour Committee became increasingly involved in 
forward planning and policy construction and concentrated on creating effective 
arrangements for drawing labourers from the Cape Colony, Basutoland and Zululand - 
areas where the Committee felt llconfident" that sufficient labour could be procured. 
These axrangements, however, were dependent for their success on the co-operation of 
the Governments concerned. The State in the Cape Colony co-operated by reducing 
railww fares for commuters (10), but on their arrival most of the recruits adamantly 
refused to work underground and others absconded. The total recruitment from this 
source was 800. (11) Better results were obtained from Basutoland, where arrangements 
were made for the recruitment of "one or two thousand  labourer^^^ at reduced rates at 
six-monthly contracts. The response from Natal was totally negative, where the State 
frankly advised the Committee that it was not prepared to "do more to encourage the 
emigration of natives to the goldfields". (12) 
The relative failure of this move led to yet a further attempt 2% an informal 
quasi-official institution in parallel with the State. This was the Chamber's Native 
Labour Department. The mineownerst Native Commissioner was to be responsible to this 
Department, which wuld make recruiting arrangements on an even larger scale. 
According to the Chamber, this official would "occupy the place which in countries 
where state-aided immigration obtains, is filled by the government officerf1. (13) He 
would provide the liaison between the Chamber's mine managements and the colonial 
government officials to sanction contracts and inquire into complaints. In order to 
increase the official muscle of this individual, the Chamber thought his power and 
usefulness would be "augmented if his appointment were stamped by government 
recognitionr1, i.e. with the title of Justice of the Peace of the Republic. (14) 
For the most part, the State more or less ignored these moves and, 
predictably, made no appointment of a Justice of the Peace. Instead, it (a) prompted 
missionaries to "make the natives understand that industry is one of the most 
important and essential principles of civilisation", and (b) acted on the findings of 
a Commission of the Volksraad on the regulations and supply of African labour, which 
provided for the "united co-operation of the Captains a.nd Heads of the locations and 
kraals with the [~overnment] Commissioners and Sub Commissioner of Natives and 
employers". (15) 
As neither the Chamber's nor the State's intervention did much to impmve 
the labour supply, the mineowners vented their frustration on the government,whom 
they accused of failing to assist the supply and increasing the scarcity of labour - 
with the consequence that wage rates had escalated. The mine managers were equally 
disenchanted with the State's performance but turned their criticism on the Chamber 
for the hi& wage rate and called for extra economic measures to increase the labour 
supply by State intervention through an increase in the hut tax. Significantly, they 
combined their demand for State intervention with a proposal for a further informal 
institution, such as Native labour bureaux whereby company agents would arrange the 
supply of labour with chiefs under the supervision of the bureaux in order to avoid 
the purchase of potential recruits by touts. The scheme anticipated the "greatf1 
agreement for rural recruitment that led to the establishment of the forerunner of 
the WNLA, in 1896, but inevitably failed, owing to lack of State assistance and company 
indiscipline. 
While the various informal institutions gave coherence to the specific 
requirements of the mining managements, the Chamber was never prepared to accept the 
apparent llofficialll status as the real, and continually stressed the indispensability 
of mom extensive intervention by the State. Whilst this was not forthcoming in 
regard to the organization of the labour supply, the State would intervene in 
policing the work force and strike-breaking when required. Hence, when the first 
inter-company agreement was introduced in 1890 to increase the control over the labour 
supply, lengthen the average period of labour service and. reduce wages for unspeciaLi~ed 
African workers from 63/4 to 30/- per month, the Chamber anticipated resistance to 
these measures and sought State assistance in the event of lldesertionll or a "general 
strike1'. (16) In the event, the resistance was on a small scale and the State police 
were not deployed. But the Chamber was assured of this protection and made use of it 
in October 1896 and after that date. Since there was little help from the State in 
marshalling labour supplies, the Chamber concentrated on acquiring expanded State 
intervention in enforcing contracts, protecting the supply and revising taxation. 
Ultimately, it was forced to lean more heavily on what it saw as its alternative labour 
resource: the East Coast of Africa, especially the area south of the Save River. 
In 1890, 7000 Africans were drawn from the Portuguese territories on the 
East Coast - approximately 5@/0 of the total African mine labour force. By contrast, 
only 4000 were recruited from the Northern districts of the Transvaal. (17) Despite 
the preponderance of East Coast men on the mines and a close working relationship 
between the Portuguese officials and the chamberls, larger drafts of labour from this 
source were not at first desired. Although longer contracts could be negotiated at 
lower rates than local ones (rural poverty, especially among the Inhambes, where "a 
state of semi starvation existedf1, accelerated migration), the "expedient" of obtaining 
labour from distant territories was considered disadvantageous to mining capital and 
embarked upon on a large scale only because of the Chamber's difficulty in securing 
more labour from the northern districts of the Transvaal. On the whole, the mine- 
owners considered East Coast labour to be expensive at £3 per head, administratively 
cumbersome to organize, and in the main unnecessary. The decision to expand 
recrui-tment in the Portuguese territories was taken only after an unsuccessful last- 
minute attempt to increase the labour supply frop the northern districts of the 
Transvaal, and the promise of increasing the physical control over the recruits by 
the enactment of the new Pass Regulations which were framed by the Chamber. In 
addition to this, there were signs that the Transvaal State would fall into line with 
the states in the OFS, Natal and the Gape and "find it wise to regulate taxation so 
that it bears most heavily upon the natives who live in comparative idleness". (18) 
Unfortunately for the Chamber, it took time before the effects of taxation could be 
felt. 
The creation of East Coast labour as the Chamber's staple supply source 
required greater organization than the Chamber anticipated and increased its dependence 
on the intervention of the State. In seeking larger numbers of labourers from the 
East Coast, the Chamber found its arrangements for the contracting, transportation 
and the security of recurits inadequate. In addition, there were protracted delays 
by Portuguese officials who charged "excessive" per capita costs. T.0 add to the 
difficulties, the recruiting agents of the Chamber found themselves in sharp 
competition for East Coast labour with contractors for the railway construction, which 
was taking the Northern railway line to Pretoria. The Chamber had little alternative 
than to persevere, however, ayld eventually came to an agreement with the chiefs and 
Portuguese officials, which was sanctioned by the Transvaal State - an intervention 
which helped to augment the labour supply on the Rand and take the pressure off the 
shortage of agricultural labour. The agreement, however, was jeopardized by the 
absence of further State intervention to enforce contracts. This led the Chamber to 
note in its press (with an eye to pressurizing the State into enacting the new Pass 
Regulations, over which there was some procrastination) that "were effective protection 
afforded by law, it would be possible to introduce labour from the Portuguese 
possessions to amy extent that might be required . . . . (19) Paradoxically, the 
greater the acquisition of labour from the East Coast, the greater the mineowneret 
dependence on State intervention. Contracts negotiated relatively far afield needed 
to be firmly secured if the mineowners were to be protected from capital loss. This 
was all the more urgent, given the increased costs of recrui-hent, transportation and 
associated expenses. All in all, the State was increasingly drawn into expanding its 
activity to secure contracts and contain the turnover of African mine labour. 
The mechanism for this protection was found largely in the new Pass 
Regulations which were drafted by the Chamber in 1894 in anticipation of its projected 
increase in recruiting. The Regulations, which were originally subsumed under 
Articles 83 and 88 of the Gold Law (20), sought "to give legal security to any company 
prepared to incur the necessary expense of importing Natives from a distance" (21), 
by imposing,particular constraints on the mobility of all labour recruited. 
According to the Chamber's description, the Regulations were "for the purpose of 
facilitating and promoting the supply of Native Labour on the Gold Fields ... and for 
the better controlling and regulating of the Natives employed". (22) To this might be 
added the reduction of wages, once rigorous control over the supply had been achieved. 
This in fact occurred in 1896, when an interim reduction of 20% (between 3 and 4 pence 
per shift) was made as well as substantial alterations in shift work. (23) The function 
of administering the Pass Regulations was assumed by the State, as were the punitive 
measures in cases concerning the infringement of the Regulations. Bolstering these 
laws was the Master and Servant Law (~aw 13 of 1880), which defined relations between 
employers and employees and in particular discriminated against African labour and 
further restricted its mobility. The intervention of the State thus became an 
increasingly indispensable factor in securing the supply of labour to the Rand, 
assisting the mineowners in scaling down wages and increasing the surplus extraction. 
That the Pass Regulations were not immediately effective - owing to inadequate 
mechanisms of control - does not deflect from their significance at a time when labour 
needs in agriculture were hi& and the gold industry was undergoing a transition to 
deep-level mining, causing two-thirds of the Chamberts constituent companies to 
register a serious shortage of labour. 
The new Pass Regulations and the Chamber's large-scale entry into the East 
Coast labour market were linked to the establishment in November 1896 of the 
monopsonistic Native Labour Supply Association, subsequently to become the ubiauitous 
WNLII. (24) As the sole purchaser of African mine labour, the Association sought to 
secure its position within the State by seeking legislation by which "any attempt 
lother than through the NLSA] to obtain natives lwould be] a criminal offence 
punishable by imprisonment with hard labour without any option of a finett. (25) 
Thaw the State declined to pass such legislation, it left the NLSA free to 
recruit labour within the country and did not interfere with its extensive activity 
in Mo~ambique. The ability of the new association to recruit large supplies of labour 
and to impose discipline on the mining oompanies rapidly enabled a 305% reduction in 
the wage rate (an average wage of 48/7 per month on a scale ranging from 1/2 to 2/6 
per shift). (26) In addition, Article L5 of the Objects of Association of the NLSA 
enabled it to act as a pressure group upon the Legislature, thereby adding - albeit 
informally - to the Chamber's influence within the State. 
None the less, despite the expansion of State intervention on behalf of the 
I mineowners, their absence from the formal institutions of the State frustrated their 
I capacity to acquire the removal of the monopolist concessions in explosives which 
I inflated their costs of production, as did the monopolist freight charges which 
l increased the cost of coal and stores. In addition, deficiencies in the administration 
l of the Pass Regulations and the liquor laws, respectively, increased the labour 
l turnover and reduced productivity. Collectively these factors were seen to "constitute 
1 an unwarrantable burden of indirect taxation on the industry and two and a half million 
stirling annuallyn. (27) H q s  Hammond (with much over-simplif ication) summarized the 
I situation for the mineowners: "with good government there will be an abundance of 
I labour, and with an abundance of labour there will be no difficulty in cut-ting down 
wages . . .". (28) Khger, less simplistically, but also naive as to the extent to which 
the mineowners had already influenced State politics, had noted eazlier: 
The only fly in the ointment of the multi-millionaires 
controlling mining destinies is the existence of a 
government at Pretoria which they cannot influence . . . (29) 
The role of Wernher, Beit and CO was singled out for special attention, the official 
press noting: 
as the Chamber of Mines is now constituted, we are 
justified in considering it merely a new branch of 
Messrs. Wernher, Beit & Co. (30) 
More generally, the major deep level interests of Wernher, Beit & CO 
(referred to pmochially as the House of ~ckstein) and to a lesser extent Consolidated 
Goldfields were identified as the chief antagonists of the regime, whose aim was "to 
steadily push for the complete ascendancy of capitalistic influence in politics". (31) 
The historiography of the war is largely ambivalent on the precise role of 
the mineowners. But, leaving this question aside (for it cannot be dealt with in this 
brief paper), the major institutional framework for the production and reproduction of 
the labour force under the system of migrant labour had been laid by the latter part 
of the nineties of the last century. But "normality" in the modern state is the 
exception rather than the rule, and the constraints of the existing State restricted 
the mineowners' scope for capital accumulation. Hence the transition from the Boer 
to the British State (after an estimated loss of £30 million, some of which was 
retrieved through tax remissions and generous allowances plus the reduced cost of 
production) released the potential of mining capital to maximize its opportunities 
(within a state in which its dominance was undisputed) to explore further means of 
cost reduction. 
The transition from the "Boer" to the British State immediately released the 
mining industry from the "unwarrantable burden of indirect taxation" that Fitzpatrick 
had previously referred to. (32) One and a half years before the war formally ended, 
the concession given to the Netherlands Railway CO by the former State was expropriated 
and the monopoly dynamite concession cancelled so that the price of explosives was 
subsequently halved and 9d or 10d saved on each ton of ore milled. (33) With 
confidence of new opportunities for State co-operation, and the weakening of the rural 
economies (largely due to stock losses during the war), average wages on the mines 
were reduced from 47/1 in 1897 to 26/4 in the second six months of l9Ol and 26/8 in 
the first half of 1902. The average rate was subsequently increased to 35/- in 1902 
and only in April 1903 exceeded the pre-war levels. (34) 
The centralized recruiting organization was restructured as the Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association (WNLA), under the chairmanship of F. Perry, a former Imperial 
official. His brief from the chamber was to recoup its stock of labour at the lowest 
possible cost. Institutionally, WNLA was endowed "with larger power and wider scope ... 
[and was] absolutely responsible for all agents in Portuguese territory". (35) Milner 
was told by the mineowners in l9OO that, subject to certain alterations (largely 
concerning capitation fees), the old regulations of 1897 would provide a "reasonable 
working arrangementf1. (36) On this basis the so-called Modus Vivendi 1901-3 was 
concluded. 
The liquor concession held by the Hatherley Distillery CO was cancelled 
and worker disicpline and productivity improved by 2@/0 and food costs lowered when 
the mines were allowed to brew their own beer (to be issued to African miners as a 
"supplement to their diet ... It would make the natives more contented and help to 
prolong their stay on the Randf1). (37) The crucial Gold Law of the SAR was retained 
until 1908 (see above) and the tax system of th former State which was introduced in 
1898/9 but never implemented because of the war was put into effect. The new system 
largely benefited the deep-level mines by distributing taxation more generally on the 
lfoutcrop" mines. (38) In addition, generous amortization allowances were given and 
beneficial tax allowance granted in respect of reconstituted companies. (39) 
Despite the increase in the tax on gold from 50/0 to 10% over which there was some 
disagreement among the mineowners, the overall tax arrangements - which were not 
retrospective - and the abolition of monopoly concessions were accepted as direct 
benefits of the war. The Chamber acknowledged this in 1903 when it noted: 
It is a matter of satisfaction to all of us that the 
general conditions under which our industry is today 
being carried on, compared with pre-war days, [has] 
certainly changed for the better. (40) 
A subsequent statement of the chamber noted: 
The chief gain that we must recognise in comparing 
our position today with our position before the war 
is that we now have a pure and sympathetic government 
in the place of the one which was, I fear, neither 
the one nor the other. Moreover, we have a certain 
amount of representation which we could never say we 
had before. (41) 
The new State built on the framework of the previous one. Labour 
recruitment and control were facilitated by the retention of the Pass Law Regulations 
(now Proclamation Transvaal No. 37 of 1901) and the extension of the Pass Department 
as well as the creation of a system of courts to deal with breaches of the Master and 
Servant legislation (now taken over by the post-war State as Proclamation No. 37 of 
1901). Native Commissioners were actively encouraged to recruit mine labour and there 
was a direct intervention by Milner to augment the mig~ant work force from territories 
in British Africa. (42) 
Milner also gave his stamp of approval to the mineowners' strategies of 
depressing wages and bringing the conditions of labour more firmly under their control. 
In a despatch to the Colonial Office in 1901 he wrote: 
Mineowners were entitled to combine in order to 
depress the level of wages ... 
He saw the function of the State vis h vis the mines as being one of cementing the 
existing division of labour by not interfering with wages and work arrangements. 
More specifically, the role of the State was "to ensure and enforce labour contracts 
resulting from such combinations of employers and disorganisation of employees". (43) 
Accordingly, the post-war State incorporated many of the pre-war laws that were 
favourable to the mining interest and added some significant new ones. Praagh (44) 
lists 17 laws that were important to the gold industry in 1906. The list includes 
much legislation which was carried over (either altered or unaltered) from the old 
State. The record is incomplete as it does not include tax and pass laws or the 
Master and Servant legislation enacted in the previous period. Nor does it include 
the various regulations enacted under these laws. It is none the less an impressive 
list. Lagden, the new Native Commissioner, referred to the old laws as "sound in 
principle" and echoed the Chamber's view that the former State's administration was 
"notoriously defective" rather than that its legislation was inept. (It should be 
noted, however, that the accusations of administrative inefficiency frequently masked 
the deeper reasons for State inaction. These concerned the conflict between the 
social classes formally within the State institutions and the mineowners over labour 
and political control. ) 
Whilst much emphasis has recently been placed on the close interchange of 
correspondence and personnel between Milnerts officials and the mines' (45), it is 
not necessary to prove collusion between the agents of the State and the Chamber to 
characterize the new regime and all the advantages it afforded mining capital. The 
plethora of laws that supported the mineowners and the accelerated intervention by 
the State on their behalf were sufficient to define the nature of the transition in 
the so-called "Milner period". Where the State did intervene decisively, however, was 
in assisting the mineowners to preserve their labour structure and to maintain the 
conditions for the reproduction of migrant labour. Despite the rhetoric and the 
official attitude to the virtues of wage labour (461, care was taken to check any 
substantial increase in the separation of Africans from the land. In fact, African 
access to productive land was made easier under Milner,and some marginal change in the 
social relations occurred whereby "farming on the halvesnwas frequently converted to 
formal tenancies. As anl'unorchestrated" increase in the separation of Africans from 
the land would have undermined the reproduction of migrant labour and the whole 
production system on the mines, the five Native Commissioners under Lagden were 
instructed not to sanction without reference any changes of succession that had taken 
place during "violent disorder" and "to facilitate the return of farms of those 
natives who formerly lived there and wished to return". (47) The adoption of further 
measures of labour compulsion through the medium of increased taxation or 
"modifications of the tribal system" were rejected by the State following the Report 
of the carefully selected Transvaal Labour Commission. (see below. ) 
In respect of increased taxation, the Commission concluded (and the State 
clearly accepted their logic) that increased taxation was prejudicid to the labour 
supply because Africans responded to taxation by raising their output in agricultural 
produce - i.e. they rented arable land from private landowners in order to increase 
the surplus and meet their tax requirements. (48) This was effectively a voluntw 
tax which African rural producers preferred to migration to the mines. The policy 
adopted was therefore a cautious one, for inevitably taxes were applied 
indiscriminately and an increase in taxation might lead either to an extension of the 
acreage under cultivation or serve in the circumstances to weaken the capacity of the 
rural economies to reproduce the workforce or provide the required welfare. (49) 
On the "modification of the tribal system" - a euphemism for measures to 
alter radically the social relations by changes in land tenure - the Transvaal Labour 
Commission noted that, whilst changes in the system of African land tenure were 
important, they would (a) take time before yielding results, and (b) should be applied 
generally throughout South Africa. Substantial changes would therefore have to await 
the political union of the territories of British South Africa. The Commission 
therefore opposed measures to tamper with the existing system and recommended its 
conservation rather than any measures that would destroy it. Change would bring about 
a number of (undisclosed) "social evils". Hence: 
Communal responsibility was an advantage which should 
be strengthened rather than weakened. (50) 
llStabilized" urban African communities (which Milner had favoured during the 
Bloemfontein conference) were similarly opposed for the reason that "its consequent 
evils would outweigh its advantageous effect on the supply". (51) 
The role undertaken by the State in preserving the labour structure of the 
mining industry was bound up with the Chamber's wages policy and the post-war 
shortage of labour. As a consequence of the acute shortage of labour in 1903 (the 
reasons for which were partly due to the recruiting and wage strategies of the Chamber 
as well as "natural" shortages pertinent to African access to productive land), the 
State was led to intervene extensively in the extension of the migrant system to the 
mainland of China as well as in the determination of the division of labour on the 
mines and railways. The warning signs that WNLA would not be able to meet the labour 
needs of the mining managements came during the 16 months after the post-war 
resumption of milling. 
In the last quarter of 1902, the labour force on the mines comprised 
42,000 African miners, compared with 97,800 in June 1899. (52) The shortage of 
labour was attributed by the Chamber to the competition for labour in public works 
and in the towns as well as the post-war reduction in the schedule of wages. (53) The 
labour "crisis" was, in fact, the product of a determined exercise by the mineowners 
to secure recruits (preferably "old hands") at drastically reduced rates despite the 
large, unsatisfied demands on the various mines. As WNLA1s chairman explained, 
having begun the "experimentt1 the Chamber felt disposed to carry it on: 
You may say for too long, but you cannot look for 
success or failure to be settled in a month, or six 
months, in a matter of this sort. (54) 
The experiment needed "time" and "boldness". The Chamber's confidence seems to have 
been bolstered by the new opportunities it had for securing State co-operation in 
acquiring the labour supply and because the rural economies had been weakened as a 
result of the war.  The latter view was bolstered by regular reports of African poverty 
from the Native Commissioners in the rural areas. By resisting any revision of the 
reduced wage rate, it hoped that the labour force would trickle back to the mines when 
subsistence and tax needs caused them once more to enter the labour market. There is 
no direct evidence to suggest that this strategy was a preliminw move to acquire 
Asian labour, but this was an item in the terms of reference of the Special Committee 
the Chamber established to consider measures to deal with the labour shortage. 
The Special Committee considered two alternatives to supplement the existing 
migrant labour force, both of which were significant and were soon to involve State 
intervention. The first of these alternatives was the substitution of white unskilled 
labour for African labour, and the second the indenture of coloured labour from 
outside the African continent to augment the unskilled labour force. The Committee 
rejected the latter alternative but were more ambivalent in respect of the first, 
proposing that,l1should the supply fall short of the present",unskilled whites should 
replace African miners in certain categories. (55) Although the Chamber rejected this 
as a general -principle, the number of Whites in non-supervisory, unskilled positions 
increased between 1901/1902 and 1906/1907. (56) The number of African workers in the 
categories of clerks and rock drillers increased from 57 to 335 in 1903/4, after which 
these categories were reserved,under Schedule 1 of the Transvaal Labour Ordinance of 
1904, for whites. (57) The erosion of the Chamber' S pre-war labour structure was 
reflected in the ~lack/White labour ratio on the mines, which fell from 8:l before the 
war to 5:l in 1902. In numerical terms this meant that there were 49,500 Africans and 
10,000 Whites. (58) The State (through Chamberlain) was invoked by the Chamber not to 
impose any dogmatic constraints on the labour structure on the mines or to identify 
itself with those Whites in the country who advocated that the mines absorb workless 
Whites in unskilled capacities at the expense of shareholders. 
The initial strategy of the mineowners in this matter was to deflect the 
pressures on them to recruit an expensive White unskilled labour force by demanding 
that the cost of employing white unskilled labour be externalized to the State, i.e. 
that they be employed as an "experiment" on the railways and public works. (59) 
Milner accepted the argument, pointing to his use of imported nawies on the railways 
at great cost - which,he explained, "the government could no doubt afford for a great 
public object" . (60) 
Milner similarly supported the mineowners in their ultimate decision to meet 
their labour requirements and reduce working costs by indenturing Chinese -labour. The 
prolonged reduction of the wage rate between l9Ol and 1903 had failed in its aims, 
and the revision of the wage schedule in April 1903 (which had been recommended by the 
Chamber's Special Committee) was similarly unsuccessful in restoring a sufficient 
number of the labour supply to meet the gluttonous needs of the deep-level mines - 
despite some vigorous recruiting activity by WNLA and assistance from Milner and the 
Colonial Office to draw labour from Central Africa. (61) The route by which the 
mineowners acquired the necessary approval to indenture Chinese labour involved the 
State in several important respects. First, Milner assisted the mineowners by 
securing for the Transvaal Labour Commission "A vast majority of commissioners [who] 
were in favour of the importation of Chinese labour and a small minority ... opposed 
to it". (62) Secondly, Milner publicly defended the cost structure of the mining 
industry during the intense "agitation debates" which preceded the importation of 
Chinese labourers. (63) Thirdly, the incorporation of the white miners as well as the 
agricultural and commercial sectors was secured by legal guarantees restricting 
Chinese from trading and agricultural activities. (64) To win the alliance of the 
white miners, restrictions against Chinese labour would be introduced into the law 
"... in such a way that the position of the white workman ... would be in no way 
jeopardised, nor any loophold left by which this coloured labour would compete with 
them". (65) 
The instrument by which this was achieved was the Transvaal Labour 
Importation Ordinance No. 17 of 1904 (which prevented Chinese from acquiring licences 
to deal in liquor, farming, trading, hawking, building and fixed property); it 
provided a long list of occupational restrictions which determined the division of 
labour on the mines and enabled the mineowners to subordinate this component of the 
work force more completely than its African labour force. (66) However, the ,latter 
did not escape the provisions of the Transvaal Labour Ordinance. For the long list 
of restrictions intended for Chinese labour was absorbed under the Mines, Works and 
Machinery Ordinance of 1903 and made applicable to the African work force. The new 
post-war State had, therefore, expanded its activities from "ensuring" and 
"enforcing" contracts to combining with mining capital to depress the level of wages 
and assisting the mineowners to reap the rewards of what Milner had easlier described 
as the benefits of "the disorganisation of the workforce". 
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Note on sources 
Despite all the recent studies, 
%his paper is necessarily limited by the dearth of material on the early period of the 
Transvaal in relation to this particular theme. More specially, it is particularly 
vulnerable to a whole range of pitfalls - not the least of which being the bias of the 
mineowners - given the heavy reliance on the published reports of the Chamber of Mines. 
Yet, in view of the historical importance of this subject and its absence of systematic 
treatment, I have used the sources most easily available to me, hoping to augnent this 
study later with a wider range of documentation. 
Notwithstanding the above comments, I have attempted to characterize the intricate 
relationship between the mineowners and "their" State during the formative stages of 
the Transvaalls industrial history. Nowhere are the statements of their strategies 
explicit and the responsibility for interpreting (often decoding) them is entirely my 
own. 
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